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Washington and New Delhi have spent the past 25 years building what many consider to be one of the most successful strategic partnerships since the end of the Cold War. But now, they find themselves in the midst of one of the worst diplomatic crises in that time as trust in the alliance erodes over tariffs, oil, and a realignment of global interests.

In a pointed assessment of the current state of affairs, Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was unequivocal. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled,” he told the Center. “The trust is gone.”

The deterioration began after President Donald Trump announced tariffs earlier this year on a range of Indian imports, a move that New Delhi argued unfairly targeted the country for its decision to continue buying Russian crude oil despite the war in Ukraine. The tariff initially sat at 25 percent and is due to double to 50 percent on August 27. But rather than forcing India to stop its purchases from Moscow, the move has instead only pushed New Delhi closer to Russia — and, by extension, Beijing.

Over the past few weeks, India’s national security adviser visited Moscow, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held talks with Russian leaders, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrapped up his visit to New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also reportedly set to visit China for the first time in more than seven years, with Russian President Vladimir Putin also due to welcome Modi in Moscow before the end of the year. Analysts warn that this eastward shift goes beyond optics.

Indian public opinion has also soured over what it views as U.S. interference in its sovereign decision-making. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

Despite some reluctance at the start of the war, state-run refiners have since restarted Russian oil imports after being attracted by discounts of six to seven percent. Russian oil now makes up 35 percent of India’s crude imports, a remarkable jump from 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war. Russia, in turn, has since sweetened its offers. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov this week said Moscow will continue to ship crude, oil products, thermal, and coking coal to India. Russia also sees “potential for the export of Russian LNG,” he added.

India’s pivot to Russia also fits a larger pattern of strategic drift that predates Trump, according to Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Wilson Center in Washington. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” Kugelman told the Center.

Some of these steps are merely diplomatic theater. But others are more long-term, Feigenbaum said: “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India has long been weaning itself off Russian military systems, offsetting purchases of tanks, helicopters, and jet fighters with defense hardware from the U.S., France, and Israel. But after the start of the Ukraine war, India’s purchases of energy from Moscow more than doubled. “Russia is so unencumbered in terms of any real baggage,” Kugelman said. “India feels this is like a validation of its instinct that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

Modi is also using the moment to burnish his credentials domestically as a resolute defender of India’s national interests. He has stressed he will never do anything to harm the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, or young workers. The move also has enormous political value at home. Kugelman noted that India had already made major concessions to Washington before this on issues including tariff reductions and repatriation of its workers. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

In Washington, anger is already spilling over. Peter Navarro, former White House trade adviser to President Donald Trump, wrote in the Financial Times that India’s oil purchases were “opportunistic” and “deeply corrosive.” He argued India needed to be targeted with tariffs to “smart[] where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

This sharp reversal of fortune couldn’t be further from other recent milestones in the partnership, like the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, which normalized India’s access to American fuel and technology despite the country never signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the time, both countries were able to compartmentalize their disagreements to avoid letting them spill into other aspects of the bilateral relationship.